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Essay

When Is It OK to Limit Direct Democracy?
Shaun Bowler

†

INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers the question of the conditions under
which it is acceptable for courts to place limits on the exercise
of direct democracy, and says something about the kinds of limits that may be placed. In examining the question of when it is
permissible for courts to limit direct democracy I make four
main points.
The first point is that criticisms of direct democracy
grounded in empirical patterns are often overstated. To date,
the search for how to place limits on direct democracy has
seemed to be ad hoc. Criticisms of the process are often ground1
ed in empirical claims that are overstated. This is not to say
that direct democracy cannot—or should not—be restricted,
just that the arguments advanced so far have not been terribly
persuasive. Concerns about direct democracy seem to cycle
around several common themes that focus on the competence of
voters and their supposed inability to deal with the demands of
2
direct democracy. By and large these claims are neither terribly new nor terribly persuasive in their own right, but they are
even less persuasive in providing a rationale for limiting the
practice of direct democracy.
The second point concerns the role of representatives in relation to direct democracy. Not only is the yardstick of representative democracy a poor one against which to judge direct
democracy, it is also important to note that elected representatives play a major—and far from positive—role in direct democ† Professor, UC Riverside. I would like to thank the University of Minnesota Law School, the Law Review and members of the Law Review for hosting the conference, along with thanks to my fellow participants for comments
and feedback. Copyright © 2013 by Shaun Bowler.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part I.
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racy. While attention has been focused on the initiative process it is important to see the initiative process in relation to
the use of referenda at the state level. Introducing referenda
into the discussion gives a fuller picture of direct democracy,
one that shows the inter-relationship between politicians and
direct democracy. Furthermore, many criticisms aimed at elections in direct democracy also apply to elections in representa4
tive democracy. Critics of direct democracy, for example, often
suggest that special interests play a large role in direct democ5
racy elections, but special interests are often held to influence
6
candidates, suggesting that if the criticisms of voting and voters justify limiting direct democracy elections, they also justify
limiting elections in representative democracy. Clearly no one
is seriously supportive of abandoning electoral democracy.
What seems to be needed is a set of better justifications for limiting the exercise of direct democracy, preferably justifications
that apply limits to both direct and representative democracy
in sensible ways or allow for limitations to be specifically targeted towards direct democracy.
The third point considers the leading principled argument
against direct democracy: the “republican form of government”
component of the Guarantee Clause. Many argue that this
clause provides a justifiable means to limit or even remove di7
rect democracy processes from state constitutions. But this
line of argument, too, is not especially helpful in limiting direct
democracy in general. Nor is it helpful in providing a basis for
specific suggestions over what to limit; rather, it seems to be a
general purpose tool that critics of direct democracy hope may
be used to shut down processes of direct democracy altogether.
Even if it were usable as a tool, it is, then, a particularly blunt
one.
The fourth point elaborates how the idea of sovereignty
provides a basis for limiting some aspects of direct democracy
via the courts and, further, provides some quite specific guidance as to the form of those limits. While the idea of sovereignty may not provide the blanket ban that critics of direct democ3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 17, 18 (1997).
6. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Catharine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the Republic for Which It Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1059 (1996).
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racy hope to see, it would introduce some limits that would
make the process either a little harder to use or easier to
amend.
This Essay is structured in four parts that address each of
those points in turn.
I. THE MANY CRITICISMS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Direct democracy is typically subject to many criticisms. As
a consequence of these criticisms, there are many calls to re8
form the use of direct democracy. Generally speaking, proposals for reform consist of measures intended to limit the initiative process in some way to make it harder to use or easier to
amend or both. Calls for reform from politicians and commentators typically involve a measure of dislike of direct democracy
9
and a determination to impose limitations. Legislators are a
10
fertile source of proposed reforms. That is, we very rarely see
legislators advocate lower signature thresholds or a longer period for qualification, either of which would help promote more
frequent use of the process. Instead we see proposals to raise
11
signature thresholds or ban paid signature gathering. The
National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) 2002 report
made thirty-four recommendations relating to direct democracy
that ranged in scope from suggestions that voters be provided
with a public information guide to the recommendation that
12
states not adopt the initiative process at all. These reforms
and recommendations by NCSL and others are typically justified by appeal to the perceived shortcomings of the process that
8. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 5, at 17–19; Rogers & Faigman, supra
note 7, at 1071–72.
9. See Lessons from California: The Perils of Extreme Democracy, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2011, at 11.
10. For example, Sen. Mark DeSaulnier (D-Concord) proposed prohibiting
initiative measures that would have a net increase in government costs from
being submitted to the voters unless the legislative analyst and state finance
director agree the measures also provide new revenue that covers the costs.
Patrick McGreevy, Limit Costly Initiatives? Idea Falls Short in California
Senate, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012, 9:10 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
california-politics/2012/08/california-initiatives.html; see also Anthony York,
State Democrats Consider Bill to Ban Initiatives from Primaries, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2011, at A1.
11. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R TASK FORCE 12, 39–43 (2002) [hereinafter NCSL 2002 REPORT], available at http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/
legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_Report.pdf (discussing legislative action related to
signature requirements).
12. Id. passim.
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are grounded in criticisms of how direct democracy works in
13
practice. That is, the “reforms” are often justified on the basis
of empirical claims that provide criticisms of how direct democracy elections work.
Criticisms of direct democracy are, for example, often tied
14
to the shortcomings of voters. Voters, goes this line of criticism, are too easily baffled by the complexities of the issues, or
too easily swayed by the TV ads of special interest groups or
both to be able to make sensible choices over the alternatives
on offer; alternatives that often owe more to interest groups
15
pushing narrow interests than the public good. The fact that
opportunities for deliberation are limited in direct democracy
means that these kinds of shortcomings cannot be mitigated,
and if they are put into the constitution, they cannot easily be
16
amended. Policy outputs reflect these shortcomings and are
likely to be short sighted, narrow minded, wrong headed or
some combination of all three and, worse, lead step by step to
something approaching a disaster. Typically drawing heavily
on California experience, commentators paint a picture of
ungovernability that is a direct consequence of direct democra17
cy.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 294.
15. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 18.
16. The ease with which initiatives may be amended varies by state.
Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Measuring the Effect of Direct Democracy on
State Policy: Not All Initiatives Are Created Equal, 4 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q.
345, 348–49 (2004).
17. For representative examples of these criticisms of direct democracy
see, for example, DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST:
CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE (1998); Chemerinsky, supra note 14; California’s
Legislature, The Withering Branch, THE ECONOMIST SPECIAL REPORT: DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA, Apr. 23, 2011, at 10; Elizabeth Garrett & Matthew
McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative Framework (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch.
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 15, 2006), available at http://law.bepress
.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=usclwps-lss. These kinds of
arguments may be bundled together with others that consider the link between direct and representative democracy in the attitudes and behaviours of
voters. Some recent debates, for example, address whether the initiative helps
support constructive or destructive attitudes in publics. One version of this
argument is that a positive set of attitudes and behaviours (turnout, efficacy,
and so on) are supported. Daniel A. Smith & Caroline J. Tolbert, The Initiative
to Party: Partisanship and Ballot Initiatives in California, 7 PARTY POL. 739
(2004); Mark A. Smith, Ballot Initiatives and the Democratic Citizen, 64 J.
POL. 892 (2002). A rival set of arguments suggest that these findings are overstated and that initiative use in particular generates mistrust in general,
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The problem for this critique is that a sizeable body of empirical work shows that the critique is, at best, overstated and,
at worst, wrong—especially when it comes to the issue of voter
competence. This literature is too well established to require
much rehashing in any great length. Essentially, a series of
works have shown that voters, generally, do know what they
18
are doing in the ballot booth. In behavioral terms this means
that voters use a mix of strategies to decide on how to cast a
19
vote. This might involve abstention or it might involve cuetaking of various forms (which actors back the proposal, who is
targeted by the proposal) that help sort out which ballot is20
sues. But voters do not always need cues. Many proposals are
quite straightforward. Decisions to extend the death penalty or
forbid gay marriage, for example, are what Carmines and
Stimson might term “easy” issues in the sense that people will
typically have responses to these issues in part based on their
21
own attitudes. Other coping strategies include using the “how
22
to vote” cards issued by parties.
To be sure, there are examples of propositions that can
readily be seen to generate confusion—especially when there
may be conflicting measures on the same ballot. There are also
Joshua J. Dyck, Initiated Distrust: Direct Democracy and Trust in Government, 37 AM. POL. RES. 539 (2009); Joshua J. Dyck & Edward T. Lascher, Jr.,
Direct Democracy and Political Efficacy Reconsidered, 31 POL. BEHAVIOR 401
(2009), or may mobilize public sentiment against a particular group, see generally Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1730 (2013) (discussing the effect of direct democracy on minority rights).
18. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 165–73 (2000); Arthur Lupia, Dumber
Than Chimps? An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66, 66–70 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Lupia, Dumber Than Chimps?]; Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior
in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994);
Smith, supra note 17; Smith & Tolbert, supra note 17.
19. See generally BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 18; Lupia, Dumber
Than Chimps?, supra note 18, at 66–70.
20. See generally Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When
Common Wisdom Is Neither Common Nor Wisdom: Exploring Voters’ Limited
Use of Endorsements on Three Ballot Measures, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1557 (2013)
(discussing ballot measures and voter cues).
21. EDWARD A. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 11–12 (1989).
22. See VOTER GUIDE SLATE CARDS, http://www.voterguidesslatecards
.com/PDFs/nov2012_dem.pdf (showing an example of a Democratic “how to
vote card” for the 2012 election).
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examples of proposals that are simply too dull to engage voters.
23
Not surprisingly there is considerable roll-off on ballot votes.
Without recapping too much of these previous works one can
simply say that too much can be made of how difficult voters
find making decisions in ballot contests. While it is sensible to
think more deeply about the kinds of processes that help facilitate voter decision making and provide the information voters
24
need, a large body of empirical work shows that voters can, by
and large, align their votes on a measure with a perception of
25
their own interests or ideologies. Consequently, the impact of
special interest TV spending is more muted than critics would
suggest. The policy outcomes that result from direct democracy
may not be the same outcome as preferred by commentators
and policy experts, but they do seem to reflect what voters
want.
II. LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURES, AND DIRECT
DEMOCRACY
A second line of response to the criticisms of direct democracy considers more fully the role of representatives in direct
democracy and the supposed virtues of representative democra26
cy. Critics of direct democracy often make comparisons between direct and representative democracy that cast direct democracy in a bad light, arguing that when citizens are
legislators there is insufficient deliberation of the issues involved or too great a reliance on TV ads driven by sound bites
27
that muddy rather than clarify the real issues at stake. The
implicit standard of comparison or benchmark is that of legislators: that is, there is insufficient deliberation relative to the
level of deliberation in legislatures, or that the TV ads in direct
democracy campaigns are significantly more misleading than in
23. For the difficulties this may raise in terms of helping make sense of
the voter’s will, see Michael D. Gilbert, Interpreting Initiatives, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1621 (2013).
24. Burnett & McCubbins, supra note 20, at 1591–94.
25. See, e.g., BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 18, at 85–106 (discussing
voters and private interests and citing recent studies that show direct democracy voters can turn individual preferences into votes on policy).
26. See, e.g., Catherine Engberg, Note, Taking the Initiative: May Congress Reform State Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican Form of
Government?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 569, 577 (2001).
27. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 22, 33 (arguing that the public receives
most of its information on initiatives through television and rarely engages in
serious deliberation on the issues).
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28

candidate elections. But there are several reasons for thinking
that comparison is not helpful.
Unfortunately, representatives are not always the ideal deliberators that critics of direct democracy suppose. Here, for example, is an account of the New York state legislature (New
York is not an initiative state and so it is not a legislature
whose behaviors are distorted by the initiative process in any
way):
The lack of debate, deliberation, and review of legislation prior to a
final vote has produced laws that include troubling errors or, in certain cases, laws that would not have been passed if they had received
public or legislative scrutiny. These errors range from unnecessary
grammatical and syntactical errors that may impair enforcement and
judicial interpretation of such laws to massive financial expenditures
29
that arguably do not benefit the people of New York.

Such problems were not one-offs but seem to be persistent features of the New York legislature. In 2009, for example, a subsequent study of the New York legislature by Stengal et al.,
30
took as its title Still Broken.
Similarly, concerns over the influence of money or of TV
ads, not being willing to vote on the issues, or on minorities being targeted are all criticisms that are, have been, and will be
repeatedly leveled at candidate elections. The example of Donovan’s work in this symposium shows that direct democracy
campaigns may mobilize negative affect towards out groups—in
31
his work the example is that of affect towards gays. But it is
also likely that candidate campaigns focused, for example, on
illegal or undocumented aliens would have similar effects. Continuing with our example of New York—again a state untainted by the initiative process and therefore in a position to be an
exemplar for representative democracy—the Citizen’s Union
reports that, “[o]ne of every 11 [NY] state legislators, or 17 of
185, who have left office since 1999 have done so because of
32
ethical misconduct or criminal charges.”
28. Id. at 29.
29. JEREMY M. CREELAN & LAURA M. MOULTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: AN EVALUATION AND
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 47 (2004), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/d/albanyreform_finalreport.pdf.
30. ANDREW STENGEL ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STILL BROKEN:
NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM, available at http://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Still.Broken.pdf.
31. Donovan, supra note 17, at 1754–59.
32. CITIZENS UNION OF THE CITY OF N.Y., EXAMINING THE TURNOVER IN
THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE: 2009–2010 UPDATE 1 (2011), available at
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Legislatures do not fall short on the grounds of deliberation
alone. Other concerns relating to legislatures include worries
over the role of money in legislative politics and in legislative
elections, the role of special interests, negative campaigns, and
the exaggerated influence of the more ideologically extreme via
33
primary elections. Indeed whole swathes of the discipline of
political science either assume or examine the degree to which
special interest money sways legislators, and the ways in which
they fail to represent groups or pay too much attention to the
34
loudest groups.
That is, the very same kinds of criticisms we see leveled at
direct democracy can be, and are repeatedly, leveled at representative democracy. In fact, at times, political science as a discipline comprises a catalogue of the pathologies of representative democracy in studies on shirking, corruption, polarization,
and rent seeking. As Sirico notes in his study of restrictions on
the initiative process, “[q]ualities such as the deliberative and
representative nature of government generally describe matters of degree rather than of kind. As distinguishing standards,
such qualities prove unhelpful when attempting to define the
35
general character of government.”
http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/Reports/CU_
ExaminingTurnover_Update_Feb2011.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The
Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1243 (2008) (documenting the pervasive influence of special interest groups in judicial campaigns); David Cole,
First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 237 (1991) (arguing that without government intervention, elections can go to the highest bidder); Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82 TUL. L. REV. 889, 889
(2008) (stating that a great deal of campaign advertisement is false and misleads voters).
34. Extreme examples of political failure of representative democracy can
be seen in European governments, where a succession of short term financial
decisions made by elected representatives—notably in Greece and Italy—led
to a series of troubles. Niki Kitsantonis, Greek Leaders Fail to Reach Consensus on Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2011, at B5; Graham Bowley et al., Italy
Pushed Closer to Financial Brink, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/business/global/italy-pushed-closer-to-financial-brink
.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=299BCD417AD2C1E018A90EF423C8A047.
Elected politicians were not trusted to solve the problems they created which
led to greater reliance on technocrats, i.e. non-democratic solutions. The United States seems quite far away from those sorts of solutions, although the
bankruptcy of a number of local and city governments does suggest that there
may be small-scale analogies.
35. Louis J. Siroco, Jr., The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 632, 652 (1980).
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It would seem that—since elections of any kind are subject
to failings related to the role of money, special interests, or lack
of deliberation—the criticisms of direct democracy elections
provide a justification for limiting all kinds of elections. If voters are not trusted to vote “properly” on the issues of abortion,
gay rights, death penalty, or taxes directly, are they also not
trusted to vote “properly” on the candidates who will legislate
these issues? The answer to this hypothetical question should
be “no.” Survey evidence suggests that despite its flaws or perceived flaws, voter support for the initiative process remains
36
strong.
Stepping back a little from the pushing and shoving implied by a framing of representative democracy versus direct
democracy, we see that in many ways the distinction between
the two processes is somewhat artificial.
A potential criticism of direct democracy may be that it focuses quite heavily on the initiative, but even in the initiative
37
process, politicians often take a prominent role. Often, this
role can involve promoting, supporting, and encouraging dis38
criminatory legislation. The point is that even initiative ballot
36. See, e.g., Mark Baldassare et al., California’s Initiative Process: 100
Years Old, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. 1, 2 (Sept. 2011), http://www.ppic.org/
content/pubs/jtf/JTF_InitiativeJTF.pdf (reporting that sixty-two percent of
California voters think decisions made through the initiative process are
“probably better . . . than public policy decisions made by the governor and
state legislature”). A striking feature of survey work on direct democracy is
that the polling tends to gravitate towards plumbing voters’ concerns about
direct democracy, such as whether there are too many proposals or too much
money being spent. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 167–68 (2008). The end result is a puzzling
one: voters may list many flaws but still like the process. Such an irrational
combination, where voters dislike everything about the process and still like
the process, might justify limited direct democracy. Unfortunately, polling on
attitudes about the process of voting may not examine voter attitudes about
representative democracy as an institution. If voters were asked nontraditional polling questions, such as whether they think legislators care more about
being re-elected than they care about ordinary citizens, it is conceivable that
for all the flaws of direct democracy, voters see representative democracy as
even more flawed. It is hard, then, to put evaluations of direct democracy
against a proper context of attitudes towards democratic processes more generally.
37. Smith & Tolbert, supra note 7, at 741 (noting that the potential to increase voter turnout, use a ballot issue against an opposing party, and ideological compatibility between party platform and ballot measure are “three motivating factors why major [political] parties are becoming more involved in the
initiative process”).
38. Former governor Pete Wilson’s use of Proposition 187, aimed at curbing illegal immigration to spur his re-election campaign in 1994 is a notable
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propositions may be strongly influenced by representatives.
This point is underscored when we consider referenda. Legislative referenda are measures placed on the ballot by state legis39
latures —by far the most common type of direct democracy in
40
the American states. They are more frequent than initia41
tives, they are more likely to change the constitution than ini42
43
tiatives, and they pass at higher rates. Although referenda
have received surprisingly little scholarly attention, they are
both numerous and consequential. For example, between 1990
and 2008 referenda outnumbered initiatives by approximately
two to one (1768 to 751) and were, of course, used in a larger
44
number of states than the initiative. In the 2012 election this
pattern continued: across 38 states there were approximately
174 issues put to voters, 115 of which were legislative referen-

example. See Dale Mahardige, The Sleeping Giant Awakes, MOTHER JONES,
Feb. 1998, at 56, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/01/
sleeping-giant-awakes (“Using Proposition 187 to help his re-election campaign in 1994 and Proposition 209 in his doomed presidential bid two years
ago, Wilson has actively courted the white voter base . . . .”); Susan Davis,
Shades of Prop 187? Pete Wilson Cuts Immigration Ad for Whitman, WSJ
BLOG (May 11, 2010, 4:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/05/11/
shades-of-prop-187-pete-wilson-cuts-immigration-ad-for-whitman/
(“Wilson
was re-elected governor of California in 1994 by making his support of Proposition 187—aimed at barring illegal immigrants from using California social
services—a centerpiece of his campaign.”).
39. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 694 (2010) (defining referenda “to be statutes or constitutional amendments that a representative body refers to the citizens for approval or rejection”); Initiative,
Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/initiative-referendum-and
-recall-overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (“There are two primary types
of referenda: the legislative referendum, whereby the Legislature refers a
measure to the voters for their approval, and the popular referendum, a measure that appears on the ballot as a result of a voter petition drive.”).
40. TODD DONOVAN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS
AND REFORM 117 (3d ed. 2012).
41. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 137–
38 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
42. See id.
43. RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
IN AMERICA 4 (2002).
44. Ballot Measures Database, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/ballot-measures
-database.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (select “all states,” “any topic area,”
years 1990 through 2008, “any” election type, and “initiative” under measure
type and submit query, then repeat using “legislative referendum” instead of
“initiative”).
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da. While some referenda may be constitutionally mandated,
some of the referenda reflect deliberate choices by politicians
seeking to change a constitution and commit future generations
47
to a particular policy on taxes or social issues. Professors Cain
and Noll raise concerns about the hypermalleability of constitutions that put in place constraints and restrictions that subse48
quently lead to inflexibility. Too many constitutional amendments are, in their view, a bad thing. A large part of the
problem they identify is due to changes introduced by initiative
process and many of the examples they discuss, such as term
49
limits in California, are taken from the initiative process.
That said, even Cain and Noll acknowledge that “[n]inety per50
cent of amendments are proposed by legislatures,” and yet, it
is often the initiative process that bears the brunt of criticism
of many commentators. Yet the referendum process sees a series of proposals put on the ballot by legislators by choice, often
intended at constitutional change to lock in their policy preferences, some of which seem aimed at ideological rivals or minor51
ities or both. Recent examples include attempts by legislators
52
to challenge the Affordable Care Act, Oklahoma’s legislatively
referred Question 755 that sought to outlaw the use of Sharia
53
in Oklahoma state courts, Oklahoma’s legislatively referred
Question 751 on the same ballot that sought to make English
45. 2012 Ballot Measures: Election Results, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/ballot
-measures-2012-homepage.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
46. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, supra
note 41, at 137.
47. Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on
State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1521–22 (2009).
48. Id. at 1520 (“The emerging pattern of hyperamendability combined
with infrequent revision has significant political consequences.”).
49. Id. at 1524.
50. Id. at 1520.
51. See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POLS. 154, 172–74
(2002).
52. See generally State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain
Health Reforms, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-laws
-and-actions-challenging-ppaca.aspx (last updated Jan. 2013) (documenting
the legislative action of twenty states to proscribe elements of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
53. H.R.J. Res. 1056, State Question No. 755, Legis. Referendum No. 355,
52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/
documents/questions/755.pdf.
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54

the official language, North Carolina’s (anti) same-sex mar55
riage referendum in May 2012, and Minnesota’s same-sex
56
marriage referendum in November 2012.
These examples of the heavy involvement of representatives in direct democracy processes support two observations.
First, a focus on the initiative process alone is a misleading
guide to direct democracy in the United States because legislators can indirectly use the initiative process via the referendum
process. Second, blaming the initiative process for pathologies
of direct democracy, and not the extent that politicians are involved in the process, seems at best misguided and at worst unfair. Some of the supposed pathologies of direct democracy
should be laid squarely at the doorstep of politicians themselves. Garrett’s term of “hybrid” democracy aptly suggests
there is room for a great deal of overlap between direct and
57
representative processes. “Reforming” direct democracy and
giving more power to politicians while taking it away from voters based on the failings of special interest politics and the role
of money or misleading advertising would seem to be a case of
blaming the victim for displaying exactly the same traits as the
perpetrator.
Overall these points relating to the legislature do not offer
much of a rationale for limiting just direct democracy, but—on
the grounds of consistency—must surely offer a rationale for
limiting representative democracy as well. What critics of di54. H.R.J. Res. 1042, State Question No. 751, Legis. Referendum No. 351,
52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2009), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/
documents/questions/751.pdf.
55. S.B. 514, 2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/
Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/HTML/S514v3.html.
56. S.F. 1308, 87th Leg. (Minn. 2011), available at https://www.revisor.mn
.gov/bills/bill.php?b=senate&f=SF1308&ssn=0&y=2011. To be sure, within the
literature on the initiative process there is debate over the extent to which the
pure majority rule of the initiative adversely impacts minority rights. Hajnal
et al., supra note 51, at 172–74 (addressing the consequences of direct democracy on racial and ethnic minorities); see also Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 261 (1997) (“Citizens in the
political majority have repeatedly used direct democracy to put the rights of
political minorities to a popular vote.”); Donald P. Haider-Markel et al., Lose,
Win, or Draw?: A Reexamination of Direct Democracy and Minority Rights, 60
POL. RES. Q. 304, 312 (2007) (evaluating data on the impact of direct democracy on gay and lesbian civil rights). As the examples of legislative referenda
show, however, anti-minority legislation is not unique to the initiative process.
57. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Campaign Finance in the Hybrid
Realm of Recall Elections, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1654 (2013) (considering how
blurred the line between direct and representative democracy may become).
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rect democracy need are a set of criticisms that lead to a justification for only or primarily limiting direct democracy or limiting some of the worst features of both. The idea of a “republican
form of government” provides the silver bullet that can stop direct democracy.
III. A “REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT” AS A
PRINCIPLED OBJECTION TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Part of the weakness of the criticisms of direct democracy,
and why the criticisms spill over so freely into a critique of representative democracy, is that they tend to be grounded in empirical or practical failings rather than failings of principle. In a
rush to criticize direct democracy elections and direct democracy electorates, critics also end up criticizing elections and electorates more generally. Plainly, no one wishes to see the end of
electoral democracy. What critics need is an argument that applies solely, or at least mostly, to direct democracy. The single
subject rule provides some basis for limiting specific proposals
58
by the action of the courts. But relying on such a rule introduces a level of idiosyncrasy in what it may apply to, and hence
narrows the scope of specific proposals but does not speak to
the process more generally. What critics of direct democracy
seek is a wider-ranging principle that will allow for far greater
restrictions on direct democracy. An example of an argument
59
like this might cite the Guarantee Clause, in effect using the
term “republican form of government” as a synonym for “only a
representative form of government.”
To be sure, the use of the Guarantee Clause to shut down
direct democracy is not a new idea. It was an argument used in
the first major challenge to the constitutionality of the initiative process in the Supreme Court case, Pacific States Tele60
phone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon. But in that decision the
58. See Gilbert, supra note 23, at 1637–38 (“[M]ost states have a ‘single
subject rule’ which is designed to limit initiatives to a single issue.”); Michael
D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 339 (2011) (explaining that judges use the
single subject rule to prevent provisions from becoming law with only minority
support).
59. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
60. 223 U.S. 118, 137 (1912) (“[T]he single contention [is] that the creation
by a state of the power to legislate by the initiative and referendum causes the
prior lawful state government to be bereft of its lawful character as the result
of the provisions of § 4 of article 4 of the Constitution . . . .”).
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Court declined to define the term “republican form of government” itself, arguing that the definition was of a political char61
acter and, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. The
Court’s decision, however, has not stopped critics such as
62
63
Chemerinsky and Engberg from suggesting that the Guarantee Clause is a way to limit direct democracy in wide-ranging
64
ways.
It is important to underscore that criticism grounded in the
Guarantee Clause is potentially a very powerful argument. In
contrast to the criticisms based on claims over the empirical
workings of direct democracy which often seem ad hoc, this is
65
one grounded in constitutional principle. Furthermore, in contrast to the criticisms that apply to both direct and representative democracy, criticisms based on the Guarantee Clause will
apply solely to direct democracy. It is thus an argument that on
61. Id. at 149–50 (“It is indeed a singular misconception of the nature and
character of our constitutional system of government to suggest that the settled distinction which the doctrine just stated points out between judicial authority over justiciable controversies and legislative power as to purely political questions tends to destroy the duty of the judiciary in proper cases to
enforce the Constitution.”). For a more extensive review of the case, see Thomas C. Berg, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial
Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 211 (1987); see also Timothy M. Tymkovich,
Are State Constitutions Constitutional?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1804, 1812 (2013)
(discussing justiciability and the Guarantee Clause).
62. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 301 (“My most dramatic argument
is that the initiative process should be declared unconstitutional because it
violates [Article 4, § 4 of the Constitution].”).
63. See Engberg, supra note 26, at 589 (discussing whether the Guarantee
Clause also protects state initiative lawmaking and opining “[w]hile it is unclear how much protection the Guarantee Clause provides states against federal intervention, the amount is probably not negligible”).
64. See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, CryptoInitiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 969
(2005) (“[W]ith the increasing use of initiatives to change policy and reform
constitutions, further constraints may be placed on legislative activity. Indeed,
as direct democracy ties up the legislatures, we may begin to run afoul of Article 4, § 4 of the Constitution, which guarantees every state a republican form
of government.”); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 43
(1993) (“When an initiative amendment includes affirmative legislation, the
legislature and the state courts might as well not exist. [Judicial opinion] does
not save such initiatives, regardless of subject, from the Guaranty Clause.”);
Tymkovich, supra note 61, at 1815 (“[T]he initiative and referendum process
itself may not be enough to implicate the [Guarantee] Clause, but when the
results of the process reach a certain degree of deviation from republican
norms, they may become subject to the limits of the Clause.”).
65. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 301; Engberg, supra note 26, at
589.
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the face of it needs taking seriously and one that cannot be rebutted by empirical findings. It is not, however, an argument
that is entirely persuasive. This is the case for several reasons.
In a practical sense, the Court has ruled that the form of government is a political question, beyond the scope of the Court’s
66
jurisdiction. Unless the Court overturns itself on this ruling,
67
the arguments of Chemerinsky and others are moot. But more
than that, such arguments are mistaken because there exists
considerable room for disagreement over the degree to which a
“republican form of government” is inconsistent with direct
68
democracy.
It does seem clear that common usage of the term does not
support the idea that “republican” is a synonym for “purely representative.” This is the case whether we look at usage in the
eighteenth century or today. For example, the sixth edition of
Dr. Samuel Johnson’s 1766 dictionary—a dictionary of the English language contemporary to the American revolutinary period—defined “Republican” as an adjective to mean “Placing the
government in the people,” and a noun meaning, “One who
thinks a commonwealth without monarchy the best govern69
ment.” “Republick” was defined as a “state in which the power
is lodged in more than one” and “Common interest: the
70
publick.” The current Oxford English Dictionary defines “republic” as “A state in which power rests with the people or their
71
representatives; spec. a state without a monarchy.” In the
66. See Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 150.
67. Engberg takes the different tack of accepting that the task of restricting the initiative does fall to Congress and uses the Guarantee Clause to argue
that Congress does indeed have the right to do so. See Engberg, supra note 26,
at 585 (arguing that the Court should defer to Congress’s “superior ability to
make legislative findings,” and hold that “Congress would not violate horizontal separation of powers by legislating under the Guarantee Clause,” because
the Court has “not yet fully enforced [the Guarantee Clause]”).
68. For an extended discussion of the problems, see generally Akhil Reed
Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994)
(discussing how disagreements about the meaning of a “Republican Government,” termed “the denominator problem,” contributed to the historical developments surrounding the nation’s Founding, Antebellum, and Civil War eras).
69. SAMUEL JOHNSON, Republick Definition, in A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 501 (photo. reprint 2008) (6th ed. 1766), available at
http://www.archive.org/stream/dictionaryofengl02johnuoft#page/n499/mode/
2up (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
70. Id.; see also Amar, supra note 68, at 752–60 (comparing modern interpretations of the “concept of Republican Government”).
71. Republic Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Dec.
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current period the definition has shifted a little to include representatives, but not as the sole component of the definition.
Plain English language usage, then, does not support the idea
that a republican form of government is one in which direct
democracy is forbidden.
But there are other troubling issues in seeking to anchor
an objection to direct democracy in some version of the intent of
the Framers. This is partly because any plausible interpretation of their intended definition of “representative” embraces
some features that are now widely regarded as illegitimate.
The central questions of who is being represented and how contentious issues and such questions are resolved are inherent in
72
any use of the term “representation,” even within United
States constitutional practice. Even at as late a date as the Pacific States decision in 1912, for example, women and minori73
ties were completely disenfranchised. It would seem unlikely
that those who argue that a republican or representative form
of government in the states means the end of direct democracy
would also argue that only white males should be allowed to
74
stand and vote in state elections. But even if we exclude the
more obvious demographic objections to a definition of “republican” as “representative as meant by the Founders” then the degree of flexibility in the term representative is striking.
Throughout U.S. political history, the manner in which elections to choose representatives are conducted and to whom rep75
resentatives are accountable have all varied markedly. This
variation not only occurred over time but also occurs over
76
place. There is an astonishing variety of democratic practice
in the United States. In the current period this variation em77
braces practices that include multi-member districts, New
2012), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163158?redirectedFrom=republic&.
72. See generally A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 13–18 (Leonard Schapiro
& Peter Calvert eds., 1971) (discussing the meaning of “representation”); Amar, supra note 68, at 766–73 (discussing how geography and demography are
two factors that contributed to the understanding of republican government
during the “Founding Era”).
73. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8
(Cecilia Wainryb et al. eds., 2008).
74. Amar discusses these issues in terms of a “denominator problem.”
Amar, supra note 68, at 766–73.
75. Joshua J. Scott, Elections, Local and State, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 129 (Larry Sabato & Howard
R. Ernst eds., 2006).
76. Id.
77. See THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 58 (George E.
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78

England Town Hall meetings, and wide differences over voter
identification laws, voter competence laws, voter registration
laws, and felon (dis)enfranchisement, as well as wide variation
79
in laws governing participation in primaries. Given this huge
variation in the practice of representation, it is hard to see how
one can use the term “representative form of government” to
capture an ideal type of democratic practice in any concise way
let alone as a useful benchmark against which to judge direct
democracy. Even the brief list of the varieties of representative
democracy practiced in the United States suggests that there
are problems in using “representative” as an analytical benchmark in order to judge direct democracy: do we measure direct
democracy against a New England Town Hall Meeting or
against majority/minority districts that help ensure the ethnicity of the winner?
Finally, even if we allow for a “technical” or possibly idiosyncratic use of the term, it is still not clear whether any and
all expression of the initiative or any and all voice for voters
(e.g., in ratifying constitutional changes) is at odds with republican government since they are not expressly forbidden. That
is, even if one argues that English language usage of the term
“republican” is not appropriate but that in a technical sense it
can indeed be used as a synonym for “representative” in some
kind of original intent reading, and even if one argues, further,
that there are definitions of “representative” that somehow accommodate both modern practices and original intentions, then
it is still not the case that direct democracy is expressly forbidden. Standard practice in the United States suggests that the
default is that if a practice is not forbidden it is allowed.
Amar goes further in arguing not just that the term “republican form” does not mean banning direct democracy, but
that a proper reading of the term in effect guarantees direct
80
democracy. In his discussion of republican government, Amar
Connor & Christopher W. Hammond eds., 2008).
78. Id.
79. See generally Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Voting Law
Changes in 2012, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2011), http://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/VRE/Brennan_Voting_
Law_V10.pdf. Oddly, the Town Hall Meeting system—an authentic American
tradition of popular involvement which would seem to have some overlap with
the initiative process certainly in spirit—does not seem to attract the same degree of criticism as the initiative process. In fact it does not seem to attract
any criticism at all.
80. See Amar, supra note 68, at 763–66.
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develops an understanding of the theme of who are “the People”
81
and what is their proper role. Along the way he notes that the
phrases from Madison—whose definition seems to be the most
important definition of “republic” returned to in this discus82
sion —have become more central in retrospect than at the
83
time. Amar believes that there is, in fact, a settled definition
of “republican government” within the context of the founding
of the U.S. Constitution that implies popular sovereignty:
Republican Government did have a central meaning at the Founding
and for a century thereafter. Many current theories of Republican
Government sidestep this central meaning; and one theory—a strong
form of the Anti-Direct Democracy Thesis—comes close, at least rhetorically, to betraying the central meaning. The central meaning of
Republican Government revolved tightly around popular sovereignty,
84
majority rule, and the people’s right to alter or abolish.

Repeated references to “the People” in United States and state
constitutional and legal practice make it plain that it is not
elected representatives who are sovereign—it is “the People”—
however defined. Amar’s argument is one that leaves little
room for those who wish to use “republican form of government” as a means to quash direct democracy.
Ultimately, it is important to recognize that playing the
“republican form of government” card does not allow for the
elimination of direct democracy. Nor does a reading of the
Guarantee Clause seem to provide any sure or concrete guide to
the ways in which we might restrict direct democracy short of
banning it outright. But the reminder of the idea of sovereignty
81. See id. at 750–51.
82. See id. at 756–59. Indeed, in a non-legal sense, it seems that the whole
debate over whether the initiative is consistent with a republican form of government consists of parsing Madison’s usage and arguing that it only really
amounts to one of the components identified in the OED definition. In other
words, it really only means representative government but he chose not to use
that word. See discussion supra Part III. That may be the case, but in historical context one would think that at the time there were some concerns over
backsliding into monarchy via the backdoor of states if Loyalists could organize. It would seem then that the “no monarch” component of the term was in
mind at the time. Furthermore, in terms of historical uses to the word of
which Madison was well aware, the Roman Republic was—like the United
States at the time—a republican form of government which allowed slavery.
83. Amar, supra note 68, at 756 (“Though [Madison’s Federalist] Number
10 is now canonical, its role at the Founding and for the next century was far
more modest.”).
84. Id. at 786; see also Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208,
227–31 (1987) (discussing the farmers’ vision of republicanism, with “popular
rule as its fundamental principle”).
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may lead to a way forward. We can see this by reference to
British discussions on sovereignty.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AS A GUIDE TO LIMITING DIRECT
DEMOCRACY
In some ways the British constitutional example of Parliamentary sovereignty is a difficult one to bring to bear on a
discussion of direct democracy in the United States. In the
United Kingdom, constitutional practice is embedded within an
85
“unwritten” constitution. Further, within the United Kingdom
86
it is Parliament that is sovereign, not the people. There are
key elements of the British definition of sovereignty that make
it an unlikely or unreasonable guide for the United States experience at the state level. But British experience is both historically relevant and also practically relevant in the sense that
it provides a record of an extant and extensive debate over
what sovereignty means, specifically whether sovereignty may
be located in the people or in parliament.
As with any constitutional construct, there are debates
87
over the concept of sovereignty. The idea of sovereignty can be
troublesome since there is an inherent tension between having
a sovereign who has a large degree of power and imposing limits on the exercise of that power. Discussions in the United
Kingdom, for example, consider a series of de facto limits on
parliamentary sovereignty imposed by a series of political deci88
sions. In the United Kingdom, the setting up of sub-national
governments in Scotland and Wales and other changes including European Union membership may even challenge the idea
89
of sovereignty itself. There are also discussions over the ex85. See JEFFERY GOLDSWORTHY,
TEMPORARY DEBATES 16 (2010).

PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CON-

86. Id. at 106.
87. See, e.g., id. at 113 (discussing parliamentary sovereignty and criticizing the theory of “common law constitutionalism,” which holds that Parliament is not sovereign because its authority is subordinate to common law);
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427
(1987) (arguing that “no government entity can enjoy plenary ‘sovereign’ immunity from a suit alleging a violation of constitutional right”); Stuart Lakin,
Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of
Legality in the British Constitution, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 709 (2008) (arguing that the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty is misconceived).
88. See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 85, at 105–37.
89. See Mark Elliott, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the New Constitutional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political Reality and Convention, 22 LEGAL
STUD. 340, 353 (2002) (arguing that while devolution is consistent with the
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tent to which legal authority may limit parliamentary sover90
eignty.
Australian or Canadian versions of parliamentary sovereignty may offer more directly comparable examples to the
United States case since both their parliaments exercise sovereignty within limits imposed by both federalism and a written
91
constitution. Fundamental rights, for example, are typically
put beyond the reach of whatever sovereign is in place (Parlia92
ment, the people). In the United States, this means that
courts already play a role in ruling some popular initiatives un93
constitutional. If anything, these limits suggest that an existing de facto limit of direct democracy is that it cannot be used
to deny rights, but may be used to extend them. In this Essay, I
take those types of limits on direct democracy as given. That is,
there will be judicial review of initiatives with respect to basic
94
rights.
Putting to one side these concerns, and the many and important differences between the United Kingdom and United
States settings, key components of the definition of sovereignty
in the United Kingdom setting are helpful in identifying tests
that may help discuss limits on direct democracy.
In the United Kingdom, sovereignty is taken to mean that
Parliament can make and unmake any law, meaning that Par95
liament cannot bind its successor. This definition means that
theory of Parliamentary sovereignty, it creates practical challenges); cf. N.W.
Barber, The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 144,
149 (2011) (discussing the implication of the European Communities Act of
1972 on Parliamentary sovereignty).
90. See generally JEFFERY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (1999) (tracing the development of Parliament’s authority and discussing the relation of judges, common law, and statute law).
91. Discussions of sovereignty in the United States often seem to consider
the role and powers of the states within the federal system. See, e.g., John C.
Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV.
27, 27–28 (1998) (commenting on state sovereignty being subject to judicial
review). A related discussion is that of the idea of state sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereign Immunity and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 65–66 (1989).
92. See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 90, at 14.
93. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, Natural Law and Popular Sovereignty: The Irish Legal Order, 86 STUD.: IRISH Q. REV. 215, 217–18 (1997) (discussing limits imposed by natural law in Ireland, where the parliamentary
system, while not a federal system, works within the framework of a written
constitution).
95. See Parliamentary Sovereignty, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www
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there is, in effect, an inter-generational constitutional contract
in which future generations are not only not bound by the current generation, but that the current generation should not put
96
in place binding constraints on future generations. This quite
simple idea has a number of straightforward consequences in
terms of constitutional practices that apply quite directly to the
direct democracy settings where one generation of voters is limited in how it may bind the current generation.
One clear example of a category of proposals that would be
ruled out on the basis of sovereignty are those proposals that
require more votes to amend or overturn the proposal than it
took to pass the proposal in the first place. Tax relief proposals,
to take a concrete example, are sometimes passed with simple
97
majorities but may require a supermajority to be overturned.
The concept of sovereignty would suggest that such efforts are
improper attempts by the current generation to bind future
generations. That is, under the doctrine of sovereignty, proposals passed by the initiative should be as easy to amend as
they are to pass in the first place in order to avoid binding the
hands of successor generations.
A second area in which limitations may be imposed comes
when we consider attempts to change constitutions by direct
democracy. A common tactic among United States politicians is
to try to use constitutional amendments to, as Cain and Noll
98
put it, “lock in . . . temporary advantage[s].” For example, Republicans, in contrast to Democrats, may prefer tax decreases
or limitations on tax increases. Placing restrictions on tax increases in the constitution—such as requiring a super-majority
vote for tax increases to pass—makes it much harder for Democrats to subsequently try and raise taxes. But the tactic is not
limited to taxation. Placing restrictions on availability of abortion or gay marriage within the constitution will also make
change much harder to accomplish. Such attempts plainly limit
the ability of future generations to make or unmake any law.
Indeed, that is the purpose of such restrictions. These restrictions thus limit sovereignty whether passed by legislators
or by voters and as such deserve judicial scrutiny. One possibil.parliament.uk/about/how/sovereignty/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (“Generally,
the courts cannot overrule [Parliament’s] legislation and no Parliament can
pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change.”).
96. Id.
97. Cain & Noll, supra note 47, at 1543.
98. Id. at 1521.
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ity is to make attempts to bind future generations more arduous. Attempts to amend the constitution could and, in light of
concerns over sovereignty, should be held to a much higher set
of thresholds and barriers than those attempting to introduce a
simple statute. On those grounds it would be reasonable to require many more signatures to qualify constitutional measures
than to qualify measures that propose statutes. It would also be
reasonable to require that changes to the constitution meet
higher vote totals than statutory measures—possibly even su99
permajorities or voting on two ballots—in order to be enacted.
In contrast to the wish of many who advocate for the abolition of direct democracy—possibly through application of the
100
Guarantee Clause —the restrictions proposed here may seem
quite modest. As modest as they may be, an argument grounded in the doctrine of sovereignty involves process based tests
101
and not outcome based ones. As such, and as modest as the
restrictions may be that are proposed here, they may be restrictions subject to judicial decision. Judges are understandably reluctant to overturn the voice of the people when they have
102
decided a particular outcome. This alone would suggest some
hesitation by the courts in deciding that many aspects of direct
democracy are justiciable even without the precedent of Pacific
States. By contrast, ruling on matters such as vote requirements would be judgments on process and not judgments on
outcomes produced by the expression of popular will. These
would be more feasibly justiciable kinds of rulings than ones on
outcomes. The doctrine of sovereignty, then, not only provides
some specific guidance on what kinds of limits may be placed
on direct democracy, it also allows for court rulings on those
limits. On that basis alone, an argument grounded in the idea
of sovereignty provides a more useful tool than one grounded in
the Guarantee Clause.

99. Both the example of restricting constitutional amendment by direct
democracy and the example of embedding in hard to overturn votes are examples included in the NCSL list of recommendations. See NCSL 2002 REPORT,
supra note 11, at 37, 58.
100. See discussion supra Part III.
101. Elizabeth Beaumont, Panel Discussion at the University of Minnesota
Law Review Symposium: A More Perfect Union? Democracy in the Age of Ballot Initiatives (Oct. 26, 2012).
102. See Gilbert, supra note 23, at 1632–1644 (discussing issues surrounding identifying voter intent and majority will).
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V. DISCUSSION
The end result—the answer to the question of “when is it
OK to limit direct democracy?”—is more or less “hardly ever,”
and then only on procedural grounds. As an answer it is, perhaps, something of a let down. It is not something that would
satisfy critics of direct democracy who seek a more thoroughgoing muzzling of the process. But it does offer one path to finding a principled reason for limiting some of what direct democracy does. It is also a path that is justiciable and so can be
applied without necessarily asking Congress to legislate or asking the Supreme Court to overturn precedent. It may, then,
have some practical application and be a means by which some
limitations on direct democracy maybe imposed.
Nevertheless, while this line of argument does open up
some possibilities of ways in which we might be able to limit direct democracy, that does not mean we should limit the process.
Critics of direct democracy seem to share many of the
Founding Fathers’ fears of majority rule. They rely on a model
of democracy that is inescapably elitist. This may well be a
normative model that is consistent with American constitutional practice, but that does not mean it is without flaw. Writing in 1966, Walker criticized academic scholars of the time for
being wedded to a particular version of democracy and democratic institutions that emphasize attributes of the system, and
value system maintenance, often at the cost of undervaluing
103
such attributes as social movements. Consistent with the anti-majoritarian fears of the Founders, social movements are often seen as manifestations of political extremism and are often
104
seen as threats to the system. For Walker, the social move105
ments were those relating to race relations, but in the modern period we may have our rough equivalents in the Tea Party
and the Occupy movements. Far from fearing such movements,
Walker sees movements like these as authentic expressions of
popular will that provide valuable information about where the
103. Jack L. Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 285, 293 (1966) (“The primary concerns of the elitist theorists
have been the maintenance of democratic stability, the preservation of democratic procedures, and the creation of machinery which would produce efficient
administration and coherent public policies. With these goals in mind, social
movements (if they have been studied at all) have usually been pictured as
threats to democracy, as manifestations of ‘political extremism.’”).
104. Id. at 293.
105. Id. at 289–90.
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political system should be going from the bottom up. In con107
trast, elitist theories emphasize the top-down.
Arguably, that same critique applies today. The initiative
process is a realization of a non-elitist form of democratic governance and one that allows the expression of popular views.
Views that—in part by constitutional design and in part by political practice—are not adequately or appropriately represented by elected officials. In fact, there are very few principled arguments in support of limiting or reducing the say of people in
government. At the end of it all, the idea that we need to limit
direct democracy implies limiting the role of citizens. Given
that the sweep of constitutional and political history across the
Western world since the seventeenth century has been to expand the role of citizens and the definition of citizenry, any attempt to say we have gone too far and need to step back and
become less democratic is a tough position to argue. After all,
asking the question of when it is OK to limit direct democracy
really is a version of the broader question of when it is OK to
limit democracy. We should think carefully before supporting
limits on the popular voice.

106. Id. at 290.
107. For Walker this robbed the idea of democracy of some of its importance. By emphasizing an elitist theory, “contemporary political scientists
have stripped democracy of much of its radical élan and have diluted its utopian vision, thus rendering it inadequate as a guide to the future.” Id. at 295.

